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The Project Independence Report (PIR) is the result of an intensive six
month effort by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA) to construct a
comprehensive economic model to evaluate current and projected energy
conditions in the U.S. over the period 1973-1985. The model is the first
large scale economic model which attempts to integrate macroeconomic factors
with the key microeconomic fact which must be recognized in any successful
energy model, the depletable nature of energy supplies. The PIR model
thus represents an extension of previous econometric models which are based
on a constant returns technology. The PIR attempts to model explicitly the
discovery and extraction process for oil, natural gas, and coal and then to
include this process in a larger model of refining and production for final
demand. Another advance of the PIR is the combination of econometric
models with engineering models and a mathematical programming model rather
than relying solely on one type of modelling procedure. While many individual
segments of the PIR model have serious faults, the overall framework provides
an excellent system for drawing' together the extremely complex and interde-
pendent sectors of the U.S. energy system. With further work by the FEA to
correct the model's deficiencies, the final product could provide an integrated
framework for evaluating energy policy.
In addition to the energy model, the PIR considers many energy connected
matters including an environmental assessment, ar international assessment,
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and the role of research and development in providing new energy sources
beyond the year 1985. Also, in evaluating U.S. energy needs over the 1973-
1985 period the effects of conservation programs and demand management are
evaluated. Since the PIR is a multi-volume document containing too many
topics to be treated in one article, I plan to concentrate on the PIR
energy model.I/
The model attempts to answer the question which underlies all energy
policy discusesions: given projections of macroeconomic growth over 1973-
1985 what are the likely levels of U.S. energy demand and supply and resulting
energy imports? An assumption maintained throughout is that the U.S. faces
a perfectly elastic supply for oil in the world market at each of the
exogenously set prices studied in the PIR. The answer of the PIR for the
base year 1985 is that the U.S. will remain heavily dependent on foreign
imports in the three main oil price scenarios considered. The three price
scenarios considered are $4 per barrel oil, $7 per barrel oil, and $11 per
barrel oil (in 1973 prices). For the "Business As Usual" (BAU) case the
FEA forecasts:
1985 BAU: Oil Imports (million barrels per day)
$ 4 ' 21.4 mbd
$ 7 12.4 mbd
$ 11 3.3 mbd
While many conflicting biases are present in the FEA model, my main
conclusion is that these forecasts overstate the likely level of U.S.
t/A more extensive analysis of the complete PIR is contained in the M.I.T.
Energy Policy Study Group Report [15].
oil imports. After.accounting for the most important bias, a severe
underestimate of natural gas consumption and natural gas price, and
attempting to adjust for other biases, my best guess is that the U.S. is
more likely to be self-sufficient in energy than the FEA indicates at $11
per barrel oil; and at lower oil prices imports are likely to be smaller
than forecast by the PIR. In reviewing the PIR, I will attempt to point
out the biases which lead me to this more optimistic forecast (with respect
to imports) than the forecast of the FEA.
The plan of this paper is first to give an overview of the energy
model, including its interaction with macroeconomic factors and the key
policy assumptions. Then in Section 2, I turn to an evaluation of the main
sources of supply of domestic energy: oil, natural gas, coal, and electricity
and nuclear power. Separate models for each energy source are used in the
PIR, and I discuss the modelling technique as well as potential biases
contained in the supply forecasts. In Section 3 the energy demand model
and its interaction with the integrating (equilibrium) model are discussed.
Lastly, the most important shortcomings of the PIR model are outlined with
suggestions made for future improvements. As an initial attempt, the PIR
model represents a significant advance over previously existing models to
evaluate energy policy and with further work can provide an important and
much needed policy evaluation tool.
3.
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1. Policy Assumptions and Framework of the PIR Model
Policy Assumptions:
In attempting to forecast energy demand and supply over a 12 year
period it is necessary to make assumptions about the likely evolution of
U.S. energy policy. Needless to say, the forecasts will be conditional
on these policy assumptions, and any change in policy could seriously
affect the results. A shortcoming of the PIR is the failure to make alterna-
tive forecasts under widely differing policy assumptions; while the FEA is
certainly aware of the importance of the assumptions, sufficient time
was not available to undertake the additional evaluations. Since one
important assumption, that of the tax laws and depletion allowance remaining
unchanged, has recently been negated, additional runs of the PIR model are
needed to evaluate the effect of this change. Given the flexible modelling
format of the PIR, evaluation of change in the depletion laws could be
undertaken by recalculating the supply model for oil and gas so that
the PIR model does not fall behind current policy making.
The most important scenario of the PIR is the "Business As Usual"
(BAU) case in which the U.S. economy is assumed to adjust to a given
world price for foreign crude and petroleum products. The key policy
assumption made in the BAU case is deregulation of crude oil prices and
phased deregulation of natural gas prices. Nowhere does the PIR analyze
the implications of continuing current regulatory policy of a two tier
system in which only "new" gas and "new" oil are deregulated. The price
of old oil is currently set at $5.25 per barrel with the average price of
crude about $8.25 (in 1973 dollars).-/ This price is well below the world
/I will use 1973 dollars throughout this paper.
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oil price to which it would rise under the deregulation assumption. Other
scenarios considered by the PIR are an accelerated development.case with
greater offshore leasing and development of energy supply sources and conserva-
tion and demand management scenarios in which initiatives are designed to
encourage fuel conservation and to force the substitution of coal and
electricity for petroleum. Since the PIR concentrates on the BAU scenario,
I shall neglect the other cases in which the policy assumptions are very
unlikely to be satisfied.
A second key assumption of the PIR is that the world oil price is set
exogenously and that sufficient supplies are forthcoming at the world
price to satisfy U.S. import demand. Three oil prices are considered,
$4, $7, and $11 per barrel, together with the assumption that imported
Canadian gas is available at $1.20 per thousand cubic feet (mcf) and liquified
natural gas is available at $2.00 per mcf. Since the FEA assumes that the
world oil price will approach smoothly one of the three prices and remain
there, the possibility of oscillations in world oil price is not evaluated.
Furthermore, no analysis is undertaken of the possible effects (if any) of
U.S. demand and supply on the world oil situation. Given the great un-
certainties surrounding the international oil situation, the FEA assumptions
are the natural ones to make. However, an unstable world oil price could
have a significant effect on investment decisions whose profitability
directly depends on the domestic price of energy.
The last key assumption of the PIR can be characterized as the "absence
of constraints" in developing and using domestic sources of energy. For
instance, the PIR assumes that sufficient capital is available and forth-
coming to finance the costly development of the electic power sector and
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that stack gas scrubbers are available to permit the burning of coal to
generate electricity. While the FEA realizes the importance of these
assumptions and even attempts to evaluate their size (e.g., capital require-
ments for electric utilities are estimated on pp. 283-288), no attempt is
made to forecast the likely effects of continuation of the current situation
in which public utilities are cancelling planned expansions due to difficulty
in raising sufficient amounts of capital.
Thus while the FEA policy assumptions are reasonable, no feel for the
stakes involved in the current policy debates 'over matters like removal of
price controls can be gained because the PIR does not give forecasts under
alternative policy assumptions. This narrow concentration on one set of
policy assumptions is sio serious that it should be remedied at the earliest
possible time so that the current pressing policy decisions can be evaluated
under the consistent analytical framework which the PIR provides.
Overall Framework:
A very important element of a successful energy model is the integra-
tion of energy related sectors with a macroeconomic model to evaluate the
interaction of differing energy prices with economic growth and prices
and wages in the economy. Existing large macroeconometric models are
unsuited to the task due to their high degree of aggregation and concentra-
tion on problems of effective demand. Production technology in these macro
models is based on a constant returns assumption, and while this assumption
is suitable for processing of energy for final demand it cannot answer
the important questions which arise from the extractive nature of primary
energy production characterized by increasing marginal costs of production.
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The approach taken by the PIR is to set exogenously the growth of real
GNP identically at 3.6% per year in the $4, $7 and $11 per barrel oil case
and using this figure calculate the growth in macroeconomic factors using
the Data Resources Long Term Growth Model [1, pp. 65 ff.]. Forecasts of
macroeconomic data from the Growth Model like inflation (5.9% per year),
housing starts (1.4 million units), and the real wage (1.5% per year) are
then used as exogenous variables in forecasting energy demand. Nowhere in
the PIR model is the effect of different energy prices integrated with the
basic macroeconomic model. Thus the interaction between the energy sector
and the macroeconomic variables is not captured and a whole range of key
questions cannot be answered.
Although the FEA does not integrate the energy model and the macroeconomic
model, it does try to assess ex post the effects of the $7 and $11 per
barrel BAU situation on the important macroeconomic aggregates given the
equilibrium solution of the integrating model (See diagram 1.1.). Using a
model of Chase Econometric Associates it forecasts the following rates of
growth over the period 1973-1985 [1, pp. 320 ff.]../
Annual Rates of Growth of Aggregate Factors, 1973-1985
$7 BAU Case $11 BAU Case
GNP 3.7% 3.2%
Personal Consumption 3.4% 3.2%
'Gross Domestic Investment 4.9% 3.1%
Employment 1.5% 1.5%
Consumer Price Index 7.1% 7.4%
Real Wage 1.5% 1.5%
i/These rates of growth are inconsistent with the macroeconomic variable
inputs to the energy model due to lack of integrating the two models.
In both the $7 and $11 case the macroeconomic assumptions are based on
GNP growth of 3.5% per year, yet the results point to 3.7% or 3.2%
growth in the two cases. Likewise, inflation is assumed to be 5.9% per
year, but the macroeconomic forecasts are 7.1% and 7.4% per year.
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Thus the YEA finds that total output of the U.S. economy is not greatly
affected by high energy prices so that the economy can continue to grow
even with substantially more costly energy than historically has been used.
One error does seem to be present. The real wage is forecast to increase
at 1.5Z regardless of a $7 or $11 oil price. However, a redistribution of
real income would be expected away from U.S. consumers toward the nations
which export oil since the price and economic.rent on oil has increased
greatly relative to other goods. While the FEA results agree closely with
the Hudson and Jorgenson [8] forecasts of little effect of higher energy
prices that model also lacks an integrated model of energy use into a
macroeconomic model. Thus before attaching much confidence to these findings,
an expanded model needs to be constructed which has the necessary integration
to fully assess the interaction of primary materials prices and economic
growth.1/
Given the exogenous macroeconomic forecasts, a dynamic demand model
is constructed to forecast demand for primary and derived energy products
in three sectors of the economy, the household and commercial sector, the
industrial sector and the transportation sector. A three step demand estima-
tion procedure is used. First total energy demand in each sector is estimated
l/The PIR also attempts to assess the economic effects of the 1973-1974
embargo [1, pp. 283 ff.] but the evaluation has two fundamental flaws.
First the price and quantity effects of the embargo are not effectively
separated so that it appears that quantity shortages may have had a
significant effect, while in reality price effects which accompanied the
embargo are the important factor. Since gasoline, distillate, and residual
rose in price by 37%, 61% and 127%, respectively,4very low price elasticities
point to the price effects outweighing the quantity effects of the embargo.
Second, when evaluating the macroeconomic effects all of the economic
downturn of the recession is attributed to the embargo. Yet the U.S. was
undergoing the "old time religion" of contractionary monetary and fiscal
policies to cure the inflation only part of which was due to the oil
price increase. Thus a large upward biased estimate of the cost of the
embargo is given.
using the exogenous macroeconomic aggregates and assumed energy prices.
Then electricity demand is forecast using the aggregate forecast and the
assumed electricity price. After subtracting off electricity demand, the
remaining demand for the different fossil fuels is estimated using a set of
fuel share equations. The PIR demand model is evaluated in Section 2 of
the paper.
Supply estimates of domestic oil and natural gas along with coal are
discussed in Section 3. ere instead of using econometric models, interpreta-
tive models are used in which "target rates" of drilling in districts are set
exogenously to the assumed prices, and the actual drilling undertaken
depends on the economic viability of the entire district. While econometric
models have had a notable lack of success in forecasting oil and gas pro-
duction, the approach taken by the PIR seems seriously deficient. Factors
such as the target drilling rates and recovery rates which should be endogenous
to the decision making process (and dependent especially on prices) are
taken as exogenous and thus the results are sensitive to and biased on
account of these exogenous assumptions. Thus while the FEA is to be commended
in attempting to model the extractive and depletable nature of primary
energy production, the discussion in Section 2 indicates that their model
is seriously flawed.
Given estimates of demand and supply, equilibrium of the model is found
using the outstanding innovation of the PIR, the integrating model. The
Integrating model, which is a linear programming model, takes the demand
estimates and elasticities over the 8 demand regions and the supply schedules
and resource requirements over the 12 supply regions and calculates an
energy market equilibrium. Schematically, the PIR model may be represented:
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Diagram 1.1. Overall Model Structure
Ex ost Macroeconomic





The output of the linear program, equilibrium prices, demand, and supply, are
all given on a regional level of disaggregation since the integrating model
solves the least cost linear program of supplying the given regional demands
of energy at minimum total cost of production, distribution, and transporta-
tion. In order to use a linear programming model a constant elasticity
assumption is made for the regional demand curves and the supply 'curves
are approximated as step functions. These linear approximations do not
seem to create serious distortions. The integrating model has a potential
advantage over econometric models in a situation which prices are assumed to
change markedly. By their very nature econometric models are unlikely to
predict well where there are no previous observations. Realizing that in
the 1985 forecasts the oil price is assumed to triple or quintuple over
recent historical experience, the integrating model forecasts by solving
the optimization problem that the market presumably solves under deregulation
and competitive assumptions. The procedure used in the integrating model
is described in more detail in Section 3. I feel that the approach taken
using the integrat4ng model provides a valuable alternative procedure to
the usual econometric approach. / While it certainly depends on econometric
1/
- The drawback in such a linear programming approach is the difficulty of
capturing in the constraints the institutions that prevent optimization.
However, the FEA assumes in large part an absence of constraints. Further-
more, it is very difficult to capture changing institutions over a ten
year period in an econometric model.
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estimates of demand, the use of an optimization model rather than a very
long extrapolation of econometric estimates is a new procedure in energy
models. Further work will determine its usefulness; however, it does
represent a significant innovation in the PIR.
My two major criticisms of the overall PIR approach are the failure to
assess the importance of the key policy assumptions made and the failure
to integrate the energy model into the macroeconomic model. Referring back
to Diagram 1.1, the price and policy assumptions should affect the macroeconomic
model and the output of the integrating model should be fed back into the
macroeconomic model and the whole process iterated until a full equilibrium
is found. (For the best of all worlds the output of the integrating model
also affects policy decisions, but models of the political process at the
policy level await another day.) The PIR has created a viable framework
in which to model the demand and supply for energy taking into account
the unique aspects of the energy sector, but has failed to connect these
models to a macro model. Thus many important long range questions cannot
be properly answered until such an integration is achieved.
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2. Domestic Energy Supply
Separate models of domestic supply of oil, natural gas, and coal are
used in the PIR. Each model is the product of a separate task force whose
reports are given in detail in separate volumes [2, 3, 4, 5]. The models
forecast supply over the period 1973-1985 by using an extrapolation of
recent past experience under a range of assumptions on the price of imported
oil and domestic gas and coal prices. The models for oil and gas are very
similar, both being extensions of an earlier modeling approach taken by the
National Petroleum Council [11]. The coal supply model takes a similar
approach but due to considerably less uncertainty about reserves of coal,
it is more satisfactory than the oil and gas models. The last major source
of domestic energy supply, nuclear power, is considered along with the
production of electric power. The PIR forecasts an increasingly important
role for electricity due to its excellent substitution possibilities, both
in production and use. However, potential problems exist for increasing




The oil supply model used by the PIR is basically an updating and
extension of a model developed by the National Petroleum Council (NPC)
in its study, U.S. Energy Outlook [11]. The NPC model is not explicitly
based on supply as a function of oil price but rather is an extrapolation
over the period 1971-1985 of recent experience under four different scenarios.
The four different scenarios range from an optimistic case of exploratory
well drilling increasing by 7.5% per year with a relatively high discovery
rate down to a pessimistic case of exploratory drilling decreasing by 3%
per year with discovery rates less than 2/3 that of the optimistic case.
Under these assumptions domestic oil production in 1985 is forecast to
range from 15.5 million barrels per day (m.b.d.) for the optimistic case
down to 10.4 million barrels per day in the pessimistic case.
Only after making the nonprice forecasts did the NPC calculate the
required price of oil which would cover costs in the four cases and return
15% on net fixed assets. The required price is the average required price
for all oil production in the United States and varies for 1985 from $8.23
(in 1973 dollars) for the optimistic case down to $6.50 for the pessimistic
case. Under the assumption of a continuation of a two-tier pricing system
the required price for new oil in 1985 varies from $10.51 per barrel to
produce 15.5 m.b.d. down to $9.09 to produce 10.4 m.b.d. Thus the NPC
model does not have a supply curve where marginal decisions are made as
a function of price, but rather reverses causality and answers the question,
'"what price is needed to cover average costs (exclusive of rents) given a
-/Much of the analysis on oil supply and gas supply in the next two sections
has benefited from conversations with Paul MacAvoy and his analysis in
the M.I.T. report [15].
certain level of supply". Given an upward sloping (true) marginal cost
curve so that marginal cost exceeds average cost, the NPC quantity-price
relationship lies uniformly to the right of the marginal cost curve as
shown in Figure 2.1. Thus as the NPC correctly notes, their four scenarios







with associated average price changes should not be interpreted as a supply
curve with elasticities. For a given equilibrium price which producers
would take as the marginal return, incorrect use of the NPC forecasts would
predict too much oil being produced and price-elasticities of supply down-
ward biased. The NPC study, while providing useful information about
possible results as a function of exploratory drilling, cannot be used a
supply relationship in construction of an equilibrium energy model.
The EA Oil Task force modifies the NPC procedure in attempting to
develop a conceptually correct oil supply curve. Since the world oil price
is taken as exogenously set by OPEC, total domestic production is forecast
under three constant price paths over the period 1974-1985. In the Business
as Usual Case / the FEA forecasts are
l/An Accelerated Development case of accelerated Outer Continental Shelf
leasing and use of Naval Petroleum Reserve No. 4 is also considered with
supply being about 25% higher.
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PEA Oil Supply Forecasts, AU
Million Barrels Per Day
Price (1973 dollars) 1974 1977 1980 1985
$ 4 10.5 8.9 9.5 9.0
7 10.5 9.5 11.0 11.6
11 10.5 9.9 12.2 15.0
The Task Force report emphasizes the uncertainty of the forecasts stating
that 'within the range of reasonable assumptions of each of 10 factors used
in the forecasts, e.g., size-frequency distribution of undiscovered reserves,
drilling costs, or tax rates, the forecasts could vary from 10% to 40 in
1985. Few other econometric estimates of oil supply exist to compare the
PEA forecasts with. Houthakker [13] gives estimates at $4, $7, and $10 per
barrel which exceed the FEA forecasts by over 25% with 15.1 m.b.d. at $7 in
1985. MacAvoy and Pindyck [9] forecast 10.6 m.b.d. at $7 in 1980 which is
less than the FEA by 3.7%. Almost all other forecasts are Judgemental,
often predicting oil production in a given year without stating the price
of oil that the forecast is based on. For similar reasons as the NPC forecast
using average costs rather than marginal costs, the FEA forecasts are likely
to have a downward biased price elasticity. However, the forecast of
quantity given the world oil price is very close to the mean value of the
judgemental forecasts. This fact must be interpreted gingerly since the
NPC forecasts appeared first, and udgemental forecasters are prone not
to stray far from the established standard. But in the absence of further
econometric work, the FEA predictions at $7 or $11 represent the consensus
viewpoint. While even a 50% confidence interval might be as wide as 2 m.b.d.,
no large systematic bias enters the FEA analysis which would lead to a
change in the mean forecast or an asymmetric confidence interval. However,
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severe conceptual problems exist in the FEA supply model, which lead to
downward biased price elasticities at both low and high oil prices and
to downward biased primary supply estimates at high oil prices. These
problems will now be discussed so that future econometric work may benefit
from the shortcomings of the FEA approach.
The EA supply model divides the U.S. into 12 producing regions with
the North Slope of Alaska being treated separately. In an approach similar
to that of the NPC model, targets for exploratory drilling in each year
from 1974-1988 are chosen, independent of any price considerations. For
example, Region 2 which comprises Washington, Oregon, and California
(excluding the Pacific Ocean) has the following drilling targets specified
Table 2.1. Target Exploratory Footage, Region 2
(Thousands of Feet)
1974 653 1982 1634
1975 967 1983 1749
1976 1054 1984 1871
1977 1144 1985 1983
1978 1235 1986 2102
1979 1328 1987 2229
1980 1422 1988 2351
1981 1527 TOTAL 23,249
The target exploratory footage presumably is an extrapolation of recent
past experience and represents a judgemental estimate of maximum drilling
rates for oil given an $11 per barrel price. Also taken as given is the
average discovery rate of oil per foot drilled for the complete region for
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the exploratory drilling undertaken. The amount of development drilling is
a downward sloping function of the amount of exploratory drilling (due to
a falling discovery rate), but it too is assumed to have a success ratio
which is constant across the region and independent of price. The total
amount of oil found as a function of total exploration is a downward
sloping function estimated from recent historical experience. Marginal
calculations presumably enter here since the better prospects will be
explored first with decreasing marginal gains as poorer prospects are
explored. Lastly, secondary and tertiary recovery as well as primary 
production are specified as constant fractions aross the complete region
independent of price. Likewise the amount of associated natural gas produced
is a constant fraction of oil production for each region, independent of
natural gas price.
The pattern of potential production at the regional level is therefore
completely specified independent of the price of the products. To determine
when and if the regional drilling project is undertaken, a discounted
cash flow calculation is made to determine the economic viability of the
project. The initial costs involved are geological exploration, costs of
drilling, platforms, and equipment, and overhead. Expensed items and tax
credits are subtracted from these initial costs to get the initial year
expenses, C/ Revenues begin in year one. Gross revenue is determined
by multiplying production of oil and natural gas by their assumed prices
with net revenue determined after subtraction of royalty payments and taxes.
Yearly costs once production begins include well operating costs, gas plant
-/Costs of lease acquisitions and lease rentals are excluded from cash flow
calculations since they represent economic rents which should not influence
the drilling decision.
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operating costs, secondary and tertiary production costs, and overhead.l/
The net present value (NPV) of drilling in the region then follows using a
discount rate r of 10% per year
T
-rtNPV - C + (NRt-Ct ) e
The lifetime, T, of the project is set constant for all regions independent
of prices and yearly production is assumed to decline exponentially also
independent of prices.
To determine the quantity supplied as a function of the exogenous
oil price, the present value calculation is made for each assumed price.
Cumulative exploratory drilling actually undertaken is calculated by assessing
the economic viability of each year of target exploratory footage given
in Table 2.1. For Region 2, cumulative exploratory drilling over the period
1974-1988 is
Region 2, Cumulative Exploratory Drilling, 1974-1988 (Thousand Feet)
$7 0 $11 12,712
$8 653 $12 12,712
$9 5053 $13 16,566
$10 5053 $14 23,329
Comparing cumulative exploratory drilling with target exploratory footage,
their relationship becomes clear. For $7 oil no drilling is done in Region 2
because the NPV is3 negative, but when the oil price rises to $8 the target
drilling for 1974 is undertaken because the NPV becomes positive at the
-/All costs, taxes, royalties, and the discount rate are assumed constant
over the period in each region except for secondary and tertiary recovery
production costs which follow a linear trend.
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higher price. When the price rises to $9, drilling up through 1978 takes
place, but not until the oil price rises to $14 is all target drilling
found to be economically viable. The reason that drilling in later years
does not take place until the price rises is, irst, that the amount of oil
found is assumed to be a downward sloping function of cumulative drilling,
and second, drilling costs are assumed to be an upward sloping function of
cumulative drilling and finally, secondary and tertiary production costs go
up as a linear function of time. For example in Region 2 when the price
rises from $7 to $11 cumulative drilling increases by about 12 million
feet. But oil found per exploratory foot drilled falls from about 125 to
95 while costs for production wells rise from $37.70 per foot to $42.28 per
foot. Thus the extra, less profitable, drilling does not take place until
the price rises sufficiently to cover the greater drilling cost and expected
lower proportion of oil found.
As the price reaches $9 all exploratory drilling is undertaken in
Regions 1, 6, 8, 9, 10, and 11A. When the price rises to $11 no more
drilling or production is undertaken in those six regions. Yet when the
price rises the oil companies are expected to undertake even more exploratory
drilling in a region because even though the success ratio falls, all oil
found will yield a higher price. Furthermore, when the price rises the
number of wells drilled in a given year would also rise. In Region 2
whether the price is $8 or $15 the FEA forecasts 653,000 feet drilled in
1974. But profit maximization should cause drilling to expand until the
expected marginal return equals the marginal cost of the last well drilled.
It is a mistake to exogenously set a certain footage and not increase it
when it is all found to be economically profitable. When the price rises
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from $8 to $15 the only effect in the model is to increase supply in later
years after 1978. Yet recent activity in the domestic petroleum industry
shows oil well drilling in 1974 is 30% higher than 1973, an expected result
since the price of new oil has doubled [12].
The reason all this is important is the effect it has on two fundamental
concepts: price elasticities will be downward biased and the timing of
the supply response to higher prices is incorrect since in the earlier
years drilling is constrained to be almost unaffected by higher prices.
The Task Force makes the mistake of trying to use the NPC model and to
adapt it as a supply function neglecting the fact that optimization decisions
are made at the margin with factors such as drilling footage endogenously
determined by expected prices. Thus at low oil prices the FEA supply
function will tend to overestimate the amount of oil produced while at
high prices supply will be underestimated.
The FEA commits a fundamental aggregation error in applying an investment
appraisal technique designed for an individual (marginal) investment and
applying it on a regional (average) scale with exogenously set regional
drilling targets independent of oil price. At low prices only individually
profitable projects will be undertaken so using average cost leads to an
upward bias. When price becomes high, companies will not stop drilling
when they reach the limits of a price independent exploratory footage
target but will continue exploring until expected net marginal revenue
equals marginal cost. Also, companies will drill more intensively in
existing fields just as old mines are reopened when metal's prices increase.
Thus a downward bias is introduced at high oil prices and the price elasticity
is downward biased at both low and high prices. Aggregation of marginal
21.
cost decisions into average cost decisions and taking as exogenous factors
which are endogenous to the decision making process makes the methodology
employed by the Blueprint extremely suspect. However, given the great
uncertainty surrounding secondary and tertiary recovery which have been
rarely used to the present, the final bias of the FEA forecasts is in-
determinate. Price elasticity is almost certainly too low and primary
supply at high prices may well be too low, but better supply forecasts




Production of natural gas derives from two sources. The first source,
dissolved natural gas associated with oil production, is essentially a
joint product. Supply of associated natural gas should therefore be sensitive
to both the price of oil and the price of gas. The second source is nonassociated
natural gas production. Supply of nonassociated gas is mainly sensitive
to the natural gas price although the distinction is not quite so clear cut
since producers are never sure what will be discovered by drilling. The
methodology used by the Natural Gas Task Force is very similar to that used
in forecasting oil production. Associated natural gas production is taken
directly from oil production by assuming a linear trend relationship between
oil well drilling and associated gas discoveries. Nonassociated natural
gas production is forecast using an essentially identical model to the oil
model - an update of the NPC model used in U.S. Energy Outlook [11] with
the addition of a discounted cash flow evaluation scheme to calculate the
economic viability of the projects.
As the following table indicates, associated natural gas production is
forecast to be relatively sensitive to the exogenously given oil price. For
instance, associated production increases by 22% in 1985 when the oil price
increases from $7 to $11 for an implied price elasticity of .49.
Associated Dissolved Natural Gas Production 1/
(Trillion Cubic Feet per Year)
Oil Price
Barrel 1974 1977 1980 1985
4.00 3.7 3.3 3.8 5.2
7.00 3.7 3.5 4.4 6.4
11.00 3.7 3.5 4.6 8.0
l/Gas price is assumed to be $0.89 per MCF in calculating the economic
viability of oil exploration projects.
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The forecasts here are subject to the same basic criticisms as those of the
oil forecasts, exogenously set target drilling footage and confusion of
average and marginal cost, since they come from the same model. One
additional point should be noted. In assessing the economic viability of
oil projects, gas price is assumed to be $0.89 per thousand cubic feet
(MCF) thus ignoring the joint product character of oil and associated
natural gas production. As the oil price rises, under the deregulation
assumptions of the PIR, natural gas price should also rise since it is a
close substitute in many uses for oil. / It is difficult to assess the
sensitivity of oil exploration to natural gas price but a downward bias in
associated natural gas production is evident. The magnitude of the bias
can only be determined with an econometric model designed to recognize the
joint product relationship [9].
The model used to forecast nonassociated natural gas production is
an updated NPC model that uses present value calculations to assess economic
viability. Projected drilling rates are taken as exogenous to prices, and
the "high" drilling rate of 5% increase per year of the NPC model is used
"since this schedule was felt to be representative of the drilling rates
that could be attained under a continuation of the present natural gas
regulatory environment" [5, p. III-6]2/ A discount rate of 10% is used
and all projects are assumed 30 years in length. The weakness of the model
is the same as the oil model - the U.S. is divided into 12 regions with
drilling being undertaken only if expected net revenues exceed average
1/
-/The regulated price of natural gas has recently been about $0.70 per
mcf. The equilibrium price should well exceed $0.89 per mcf when oil
is $11 per barrel since the PIR states that the price is "allowed to rise
to clear the market" [1, p. 91].
-/Note the apparent inconsistency of this assumption with the price
clearing partial regulation assumption.
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cost for the entire region with no increase in drilling in a given year
once the target drilling footage has been met no matter how much the price
increases. While in the oil forecasts the direction of bias could not be
determined, here a clear downward bias in nonausociated production is
evident. The FEA forecast of nonassociated natural gas production is
almost independent of the market clearing price. For example, in all years
when gas price goes up by 120% from its approximate current price, non-
associated production does not rise at all!
Nonassociated Natural Gas Production
(Trillion Cubic Feet per Year)
/MCF. 1974 1977 1980 1985
$ .40 16.5 15.2 13.3. 9.5
.60 16.7 15.8 16.0 16.7
.80 16.7 16.1 16.4 18.1
1.00 16.7 16.1 16.4 18.2
2.00 16.7 16.1 16.4 18.2
Thus the FEA assumes nonassociated production to be totally price inelastic
in the relevant range due to the use of the target drilling series assumed
to increase at only 5% per year. The only increase in gas supply comes
from associated natural gas production as the oil price rises and from
imports which are assumed available at $1.20 per mcf. These forecasts seem
severely downward biased especially given the recent surge in gas exploration
coupled with the partial deregulation assumption of the PIR.
The effect of this bias is considerable since natural gas currently
provides 1/3 of total energy consumption and 1/2 of total nontransportation
energy consumption. Furthermore, given the substitution possibilities between
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natural gas and oil in many uses, a price of $0.90 per mcf given $7 oil and
$1.40 per mcf given $11 oil would be first round guesses at the equilibrium
natural gas price given exogenously set oil prices so that more associated
production would be expected. This downward bias for supply coupled with
incorrect estimation of demand for natural gas discussed in a later section
leads to the conclusion that the PIR overestimates the U.S. demand for
imported oil especially in the $11 case. Natural gas supply cannot be as
inelastic as the FEA forecasts it to be.
The reasons for this incorrect forecast is that completely independent
of price the Task Force assumes drilling to increase at 5% per year (although
the average increase in the last two years is around 25%) and that the
recent sharp increases in drilling costs will continue over the next ten
years [12]. Furthermore, estimates of the recovery rate of gas as a function
of cumulative drilling decline much faster than the assumed recovery rate
of oil. An implicit, incorrect assumption is made that deregulation will
have no effect on gas supply. Thus a severe downward bias is introduced
into the-forecast because the Task Force based drilling rates on the experience
of the early 1970's when gas drilling was dampened by the efforts of field
price regulation and a rapid increase in drilling costs.
While the direction of the bias is downward, an assessment of the
magnitude is difficult. With $11 oil the PIR forecasts 21 trillion cubic
feet in 1980 and 26.2 trillion cubic feet in 1985. Converting to quadrillion
BTU's per year leads to estimates of 21.6 quads and 27.0 quads, respectively.
These estimates are well below the NPC forecasts 11] in the high case-of
31.3 and 41.1 quads and the Ford Foundation Base Case [7] of 28.0 and 32.0
quads. For oil at $7 per barrel in 1980, MacAvoy and Pindyck [9, Ch. 5]
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forecast 36.1 quads. Concentrating on $11 oil for 1985, the FEA forecast
is between 5 and 14 quads below alternative estimates. This downward bias
amounts to between 2.4 and 6.7 million barrels per day of oil equivalent -
enough to make the U.S. self-sufficient in energy in 1985 with $11 oil
given FEA demand forecasts and substitution of natural gas for oil. A
similar calculation shows that at $7 per barrel oil, the FEA's forecasts of
12.4 million barrels per day of oil imports could be halved by replacing
oil use with the likely additional gas supplies. Therefore, a significant
and important bias is present in the PIR's natural gas supply forecasts.
This bias could easily make the difference between the U.S. being a net
energy exporter rather than importer in the $7-$11 range for oil prices in
1985.
The models constructed to forecast both oil and gas supplies are based
on incorrect economic methodology. The most important factors are taken
to be exogenous and are based more on an extrapolation of recent past ex-
perience than on economic decisions. As in the natural gas model, a certain
growth rate of drilling is specified exogenously and only ex post is it
determined if the drilling is economically profitable. Yet when the natural
gas price doubles from the recent price, all the targeted drilling is under-
taken and so no matter how much more the price rises, no further supply
response is forecast. Supply models based on economic decisions where
variables such as exploratory drilling become endogenous seem necessary
to avoid the errors inherent in the FEA methodology. Since the greatest
uncertainty in energy models is with the supply forecasts, it is critical
that further work be done in this area.
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Coal
The approach used by the coal Task Force is similar to that used in
estimating the supply functions of oil and gas. The U.S. is divided into
7 regions and in each region for each year from 1974-1990 production
targets are set. These production targets are met by a combination of
mining from existing and new deep mines and surface mines. The relative
amounts of coal from each type of mine are not decided by a cost minimizing
(marginal) approach but rather from "professional judgement used to determine
a logical mix of mines for each region for each year" [4, p 20]. A "minimum
acceptable selling price" which is an average cost concept is then developed
for each region. But since this price is determined separately for each
type of mine, problems of aggregation are not as severe as in the oil
estimates.
The minimum acceptable selling price is determined using detailed
engineering cost estimates. A 151 rate of return and 20 year life of project
assumption is coupled with the assumption of no increases in factor costs
at 1973 prices to determine costs for each mine type. The cost for each of
the four mine types then given the steps of the regional supply curve
Figure 2.;2
Region 2, Southern Appalachianper ton
D
, ... A. Existing Surface
C I B. Existing Underground




Million Tons per Year_ ___ I
I
28.
The highest price coal is new underground coal which entails opening new
mines. The supply curve here is assumed perfectly elastic since the Task
Force assumes that scarcity of deep mine reserves is not a constraint. Even
though the new deep mines are more expensive, the Task Force assumes they
will not be replaced by new surface mines since deep-mined coal generally
has a higher BTU content and lower sulphur content. Furthermore, in both
the $7 and $11 oil cases, all but one of the seven regions have equilibrium
supply on this perfectly elastic section of the supply curve with marginal
cost (in Appalachia) of $13.50 per ton. This finding is a result of the
Task Force's assumption that "in the long run coal supply will be demand
constrained instead of being either resource or price constrained." [4, p. 311.
The supply function given in Figure 2.2 is the same for all years in
each region. This constant supply curve result follows from two key assump-
tions: no increase in factor costs over the period 1974-1985 - which would
tend to shift the curve upward - and no effect from depletion. As a result
for any region and mine type the new mine prices are constant over time.
The Task Force explicitly states these assumptions, but makes no estimates
of what effect their nonfulfillment might have. An inconsistency in their
assumptions is present since they assume that current manpower shortages
are alleviated by increases in workers wages and benefits [4, p. 17], an
occurrence which is unlikely without an increase in real wages which will
increase factor costs unless productivity increases sufficiently fast to
counteract rising wages. Since wages constitute 35% of total costs of
mining, this assumption could be seriously violated if the United Mine
Workers decide to press for higher wages. The effect of assuming negligible
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depletion is more difficult to assess; but the effect of the two assumptions
probably leads to a downward bias in expected coal costs over the next
decade.
Other important assumptions by the Task Force are the existence of-
stack gas scrubbers in later years and an adequate transportation network
for shipment of western coal to eastern markets so that the "clean fuels"
deficit is eliminated. While neither of these assumptions is objectionable,
both should lead to higher costs of coal than the PIR forecasts. These
higher costs could have a significant effect since the PIR forecasts that
in the $11 case in 1985 coal will increase its share of energy supply from
the current 17% to 23.4%. Most of this increase in coal consumption occurs
in the electric utility sector and would lead to higher electricity prices
than the FEA forecasts. However, given current judgement the downward bias
in the cost of coal is probably not large enough to have a significant
effect on the supply of electricity forecast in 1985.
While the forecasts of the coal supply model seem "reasonable",
logical problems still exist due to the assumption of no depletion effects.
The Task Force assumes a given mix of mines based on their professional
judgement, but the mix is not determined endogenously in the model as it
should be on cost minimization criteria. If depletion effects are added
to the model, the mix would change and the perfect elasticity assumption
of the coal model is no longer reasonable. An explicitly specified model
seems preferable so that the effects of altering the assumptions can be.
evaluated.
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Electricity and Nuclear Power
The PIR forecasts a greatly increased role for electricity in satis-
fying U.S. energy needs by 1985. While total energy use is forecast to
grow at 2.7% over the period 1973-1985 for the $11 oil BAU case, electricity
supply is forecast to grow at the higher rate of 6.3% per year. The reason
for this dramatic change in energy use is the substitution possibility
for electricity, both in production and use. Electricity can be produced
by both fossil fuels and by hydropower and nuclear power. Relatively
plentiful and inexpensive coal can be substituted for higher cost imported
oil, thus helping reduce reliance on imported oil. Furthermore, electricity
is a substitute for fossil fuels in many energy uses. In applications
where stationary heat is required, electricity can be substituted for oil
produced heat again providing an economic alternative free from oil import
problems. Lastly, in the period up to and beyond 1985, electricity is
the vehicle for using nuclear power which many believe offers a partial
solution to long range energy supply problems.
The FEA electricity supply model is an excellent example of the use
of an engineering production function rather than the more commonly used
econometric estimates. Assuming as constant over 1973-1985 the historic
ratios of capacity factors, reserve requirements, and load requirements,
the electricity model meets the demand with the least cost combination
of existing and incremental plant capacity.l/ The amount of nuclear
capacity in each year is taken as exogenous (and the same in all BAU runs).2
"/The load factors used are 75% base load, 20% intermediate load, and 5%
peak load capacity.
-2/For new base load capacity nuclear power is the least expensive alternative.
However, the PIR constrains the amount of new nuclear capacity because
of long lead times, now about 10 years, in construction of nuclear
generating plants.
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Thus given fuel costs, equipment design characteristics and costs, and the
cost of capital, the program is solved which meets electricity demand at
least cost. A weakness of this approach is the use of historic ratios,
especially the load factors, as exogenous rather than solving for them
endogenously as part of the optimizing solution. This fact becomes especially
important given the radical change in relative fuel prices over the past
few years and the increasing importance of coal and nuclear generated
electricity. The overall approach adopted by the FEA is sound; the exogeneity
of the historic ratios could easily be eliminated in an expanded model.
The least cost solution for new base load plants most heavily weights
the variable costs, fuel costs and operating costs, so that the PIR forecasts
most new base load plants will be either nuclear plants or coal fired
steam turbine plants. On the other hand, intermediate and peaking plants
trade off higher variable costs against lower capital costs since they are
not in continuous use. The least cost solution for the 1985 $11 oil BAU
case is
Load Type % of Total Capital Costs Generation Costs
(per kilowatt) (per kilowatt hour)
Base 75% $350-480 $.0014-.0022
Intermediate 20% $210-240 $.0025
Peak 5% $100-120 $.0040-.0050
Since base load represents 75% of total capacity, the PIR forecasts
increased use of coal in electricity generation. This forecast is a
reversal of the historic trend which has seen coal fall from 65% of total
fuel consumed for generation in 1965 to 54% in 1973 while oil doubled from
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10% in 1965 to 20% in 1973. This marked shift is evident in the electricity
capacity forecasts for 1985 $11 oil in the BAU case:
Eletricity Capacity and Fuel Consumption
KWxlO 6 (GWe)
1973 Capacity 1/ 1985 Capacity 1985 Fuel Consumption
(Trillion BTU's)
Total 424 922 34397
Coal 167 (39.4%) 327 (35.4%) 16424 (47.7X)
Nuclear 20 (4.7%) 204 (22.1%) 12509 (36.4%)
Oil 78 (18.4%) 81 (8.8%) 2954 (8.6X)
Gas 61 (14.4%) 48 (5.2%) 2510 (7.3X)
Gas turbines, used largely for peak load plants, decrease while oil fired
turbines, used largely on the Eastern seaboard, remain constant. 2 Coal
capacity grows at approximately the average capacity growth rate, while
nuclear generating capacity increases to over 1/5 total capacity.
The forecast of greatly increasing nuclear generation capacity must
be regarded as highly uncertain. Since the construction lead time is
presently about 10 years with long delays in equipment delivery and con-
struction as well as difficulty in obtaining licenses, any difficulties
in the near future could lead to a large reduction in electricity capacity. 3/
Also nuclear plants (and coal) have the highest capital costs and the
present difficulty of utilities in raising capital to finance expansion
l/Total includes hydro generation capacity and combustion turbines.
2-The electricity model is constrained not to install gas fired generating
capacity even though it has lower cost for peaking plants.
--/A curious inconsistency is present since although electricity capacity
is forecast to grow at 6.3% per year, while electricity demand grows at
only 5.6% per year.
may lead to further delay and upward biased forecasts. Thus while the PIR
explicitly assumes that financing will not be a constraint, this current
problem and the other difficulties associated with developing nuclear
capacity may make the FEA forecasts much too optimistic. - / Unless present
constraints to developing new electricity capacity are eased soon, the PIR
forecast of a greatly increased role of electricity in meeting energy
demand will be impossible to attain given the very long lead times required
to construct electricity generating capacity.
-/For an analysis of the effect of financing problems on the electric
power sector see Joskow and MacAvoy [14].
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3. DEMAND ESTIMATES AND INTERACTION WITH THE INTEGRATING MODEL
As described in Section 1, the FEA Demand Simulation Model is used to
compute the regional demand estimates and national price elasticities which
are inputs to the integrating model. Each solution of the linear program
is based on a particular set of regional demands for various fuels which
in turn is based on certain assumed energy prices. Subsequent solutions of
the overall integrating framework are performed until the system has
obtained "equilibrium" in the sense that the prices implicit in the demand
figures for a particular solution are consistent with the implicit supply
prices of domestic energy sources.
Hence the structure of the demand model (as summarized in the elasti-
city measures) and the detailed mechanisms of the procedure by which the
system iterates to an equilibrium solution are as important to the process
of estimating energy production and consumption levels as the supply func-
tions discussed in Section 2.
Methodology of the FEA Demand Simulation Model 1/
The model developed by the FEA involves first estimating energy demands
at the national level, conditional upon macroeconomic and demographic
variables, and energy prices, and technology variables, and then dis-
aggregating to the Census region level of detail. Fuel and Power demands
are estimated for four major consuming sectors:. household and commercial,
-/The FEA Demand Simulation Model is described in PIR 1], Appendix II.
Footnote 1 of that appendix indicates that two technical reports will be
published describing the model, including reports by Data Resources, Inc.,
and FEA, but as yet these reports have not been released.
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industrial, and transportation. Industrial demands for fossil fuels for
use as raw materials are estimated separately.-
The transportation demand equations are based upon differing specifi-
cations depending upon the particular fuel. For example, gasoline demand
per capita is a function of gasoline price and income per capita. Demands
for liquified gases and residual fuel oil are functions of prices, but jet
fuel demands are independent of price, depending only upon assumptions about
route miles and load factors.
The demand equations for the household and commercial and the industrial
sectors employ a common specification. The FEA procedure involves a three-
step process:
(1) Total energy demand is estimated from aggregate time-series data,
using an energy price index (calculated with actual energy
shares and prices year to year) and other variables representing
economic and industrial activity. For example, in the household
and commercial sector the estimated total energy demand equation
in trillion BTU's has the log-linear form
HF PHF 1 ELEC_2 PELEC 1
log TOTHC + TOHC CPI TOTHC CPI log HOUSE
+ a3 log YDIS
where HF is the amount in BTU's of heating fuel consumed with PHF its price
index and CPI the consumer price index while ELEC and PELEC are the con-
/Raw material demands are assumed to be a function of industrial activity
levels, lagged consumption levels, and time. Prices are not included
in these equations.
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sumption in BTU's and price index, respectively, of electricity. The
variable HOUSE is the housing stock and YDIS is disposable income. Thus
individual energy demands and prices are aggregated into an index; the
individual shares are estimated at the third step of the process.
2. Electricity Demand: In the first step total demand for energy, both
fossil fuels and electricity, is estimated. In the second step electricity
consumption is estimated and subtracted from total energy consumption in
each sector. For example, in the household and commercial sector electricity
demand is estimated by the log linear equation
PELEC PHF
log ELEC - log HOUSE + a + al log EEC + 2 log PHF + a log YDIS
+ a4 MDDAY
where the only new variable is MDDAY, mean degree days.1 / Once electricity
demand is estimated, it is subtracted from the total energy demand estimate
from step one. The remained is the total "direct demand" for fossil fuels
by each sector. This total demand for fossil fuel is then divided into'
its components in the last step.
3. Fossil Fuel Shares: After electricity has been subtracted off, fossil
fuel demand is divided into its component shares. For example, in the
household and commercial sector six share equations are used to estimate
/While an attempt to use marginal price in the household and commercial .
sector is made, it appears that average prices are used in the industrial
sector. Since average price decreases with demand, a upward bias in
the own price elasticity of electricity results. This mistake may
explain why the PIR has to later "doctor" the estimated industrial
electricity elasticities by dividing them by 6.0.
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the shares of seven fuels: anthracite coal, bituminous coal, natural gas,
liquified gas, kerosene, residual fuel, and distillate fuel. The last
share, for distillate fuel, follows from the adding up criterion that fuel
shares must sum to unity. To estimate the shares, a derived demand
framework is used with an econometric specification similar to a conditional
logit probability model. Each energy share is estimated conditional-on its
own characteristics (price) and the characteristics of the base fuel,
distillate. Thus the ratio of the share of natural gas consumption to
distillate fuel consumption in the household and commercial sector is
estimated by the equation
SNG . .PNG SNGlog (-S) a0 + al log (p-) + a2 log (TIME) + a3 log (SD)-l 
The ratio of the shares depends only on own price and the price of the
basis share together with a time trend and the lagged share ratio. The
prices of the other competing fuels do not directly enter the equation.
This econometric specification imposes very strong assumptions on the
structure of underlying demands. For instance, the specification imposes
the restriction that all cross price elasticities with respect to a given
price change are identical. Therefore, the cross-elasticity of anthracite
coal and natural gas with respect to residual are assumed to be the same.
An improvement in the demand equations would be to include other prices
beside only the own price and base fuel price in the specification. Then
the cross-elasticities would not be constrained to have identical values.
The results of the three step process are estimates of total national
energy demand, national electricity demand, and national energy demand
for the principal fossil fuels, coal, natural gas, and petroleum products.
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These national estimates are disaggregated down to the level of regional
demand functions at a later point for use in the integrating model.
Inputs to the Integrating Model
The national (aggregate) demand system forecasts national demands
and own price and cross price elasticities in each of the three sectors.
The pocedure used is to specify an exogenously given path of energy prices
over the period 1974-1985. National demand forecasts and elasticities
are estimated for each year on the price path. Forecasts of demands and
elasticities are made on the regional level from these national forecasts,
and those forecasts provide the basic demand input data to the integrating
model which solves the system to find an equilibrium. The procedure used
to estimate the regional demand curves is as follows.
National Demand Forecast. A set of prices for different energy sources
for the period 1973 to 1985 is specified, based on a terminal (1985) price
of crude oil (either $7, $11, or $15 per barrel). The sets of prices used
in the PIR analysis are shown in Table 3.1. The prices in the table for
oil products, residual fuel, distillate, and gasoline are determined from
the crude oil price and by a constant markup assumption. The natural gas
and coal prices are set at values exogeneously determined by the analyst.
The time path of prices for oil products and electricity between 1973 and
the assumed price in 1985 is based on an exponential trajectory, with 90
percent of the 1973 to 1985 price change achieved by 1977, as shown in
Table 3.1.
These vectors of energy prices are then used to compute price indices
akin to the ones used in the original model estimation. The shares of
energy demand do not change over the 1973-85 period in constructing this
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index; 1972 weights are used throughout. Total energy demand for each year
is then estimated from step 1 of the national demand system using the total
energy demand equations for each sector with values of the independent
variables being the composite energy price index and indices of economic
activity such as disposable income exogenously forecast by a macroeconomic
model.: Individual energy product demands are then computed using step 2
to estimate electricity demand and step 3 to estimate individual fossil
fuel shares, with the 1973-85 prices for the separate energy products
being input as independent variables.
Demand Elasticities. Each own and cross price elasticity then is
calculated by changing the price of one fuel at a time by 5 percent and
observing the set of quantity changes each year that result. A separate
set of these calculations is done under the $4, $7, $11, and $15 ultimate
oil price. For the household and commercial and the industrial sectors,
the quantity change which is observed under this procedure is composed of
two parts: (1) the change in total energy demand from step 1 which is
a function of the composite fuel index derived from the individual energy
prices, and (2) a change in the fuel shares through step 3 with the logit
fuel split equation. These own price elasticities and cross price elasticities
are then used in the integrating model to move from the initial approximation
to the equilibrium.
Regional Demands. National demand for each fuel is divided into a set
of regional demands and regional prices using coefficients calculated from
1960-72 data. The regional share coefficients are calculated using regional
value weighted shares of national demand, and the regional price coefficients
are calculated by using the average relationship of regional to national
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prices. These regional share and price coefficients remain fixed over the
1973-85 period regardless of changes in relative energy prices. Then,
given a regional demand calculated in this way and a regional price again
calculated by a fixed weight index, the demand curve for the regional price-
quantity pair is fixed by assuming that the demand elasticity is constant
over the whole demand curve and is identical for all regions. Thus, say









Figure 3.2: North Central 1985 Natural Gas Demand Function
The regional price (from the trajectory) and quantity (using 1973 weights)
determine the point A, and the slope of the straight line (in logs) is
determined by the national elasticity. The demand functions for all regions
by assumption will have the same slope with their distance from the origin
determined by the regional share and regional price coefficients. As can
be seen in Figure 3.3 this assumption of parallel demand curves across
m
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Figure 3.3. Regional Natural Gas Demand Functions
The Use of Regional Demand Functions Within the Integrating Model
Given these regional demand curves (with elasticities) as specified
by the demand model, and given the supply curves, (discussed in Section 2),
a Marshallian adjustment process is used to equilibrate the integrating
model. That is, starting with a set of demands which result from the initial
price trajectory shown in Table 3.2, the least cost supply distribution is
calculated using the linear program integrating model. The integrating model
produces "shadow prices" which are the implicit marginal prices of the
regional energy supplies. These regional supply prices are compared to the
demand prices on which the initial regional demand quantities were based.
If the prices agree, a regional and national equilibrium has been attained
and no adjustment is made. If the prices differ, then there is a two-
step process to approach overall equilibrium. First, a price half-way
in between the demand and supply price is used' to calculate new regional
demands using the national elasticity matrix:
log D log D + M log P - log P]
where D is the vector of regional demands, P the vector of the new regional
demand prices with P the old price vector and M is the matrix of own
and cross price elasticities. With the new demands, a new LP solution is
computed, and if the model and data are well behaved, the solution should
converge to an overall supply-demand equilibrium. If equilibrium is at-
tained, it will be characterized by different regional prices and energy
shares, depending on the different transport costs and the characteristics
of the M matrix.A /-
Even if equilibrium is attained in the LP solution, there still may
exist a disequilibrium in the system, for the resulting prices may drift
far from the price assumptions that went into the original price index
used in estimating aggregate national energy demand and national price
elasticities. In this case, it would be necessary to cycle back through
the whole demand forecasting model--starting with new trajectories and com-
puting new demand paths and elasticity matrices. The reason this step is
needed for equilibrium is that the positioning of the regional demand
curves--not only the elasticity, but more importantly, their position in
price-quantity space--depends on the original price trajectory chosen.
This can be indicated on the following diagram, where D1D1 and DD 2 are
1985 demand functions resulting from two alternative price trajectories.
Both the position of DD and its slope depend on the initial relative
prices chosen and the dynamic character of the demand functions. Given
a regional supply curve, it is very unlikely that it would pass through
the intersection 11 2D2
-/Output for the $11 "Business As Usual" scenario by demand region and pro-
ducts is presented in [1, Appendix IV, pp. 269-275].
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integrating model provides equilibrium prices for, say, 1985, these prices
would need to be used to generate a new set of prices with new regional
demand curves computed. The equilibrium solution of these new demand
curves would be used to form another new price set. If the procedure
converged, a full equilibrium would be attained.
Another similar shortcoming is that once a full equilibrium of the
supply-demand system is found, in principle these results should affect
the level of macroeconomic activity which is used in forecasting total
energy demand. That is, the forecasts of aggregate demand and investment
should be sensitive to factor prices in the economy. Thus-if the assumptions
used to make the macro forecasts are not consistent with the energy prices
and quantities, serious biases could result. The Blueprint assumes that
the level of macroeconomic activity remains constant while the world oil
price varies from $4 to $15. This assumption should be replaced by
integrating the macroeconomic model with the energy model, a very difficult
task.
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Evaluation of the FEA Methodology
Estimation Problems: The FEA procedure in introducing demand into the
integrating framework appears satisfactory in principle, but in practical
application, given the data available during the study period, a number of
serious problems are encountered.
The essence of the first problem can be seen in Table 3.2, which
presents the own and cross elasticities for the Household and Commercial
sector and for the Industrial sector. The model produces the counter-
intuitive result that, in the Household and Commercial sector, natural gas
and coal are complements of residual and distillate fuels rather than
substitutes for them (that is, the cross elasticities are negative when
they would be expected to be positive), so that as the price of oil rises
the demand for natural gas falls in this model. Even in the industrial
sector, the cross elasticity of coal demand to oil price is negative, and
the cross elasticity of natural gas demand is essentially zero.l/
l/The problem arising in this demand estimation can be seen in the following
example considering a change in the demand for fuel oil. A rise in the
price of natural gas decreases total energy demand (since the price index
rises), but for a given total demand increases the share of residual fuel
oil which is a close substitute for natural gas. Thus the cross price
elasticity of residual demand with respect to natural gas price is:
Ena . d Res d Tot d Pindex + dres
_ _ _ _ d _ _ res dTot
RES d png res d Pindex d png d png Res
where demand for residual is Res - ares Tot, and Z a i - 1. It is expectedi
that the sign of the total derivative is positive, given that residual and
natural gas are close substitutes. In fact, the FEA demand estimates must
have the first term, the "output or income effect" being large and negative,
for their estimates show natural gas and residual to be complements, not
substitutes. While in theory the sign of the derivative is indeterminate,
most analysts would find it very surprising that these fuels are complements.
This problem likely arises from the restriction inherent in the demand share
specification that the cross share elasticities are identical across all
fuels for a given change in price of one fuel. Thus the second term is an
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Now it is not altogether obvious what all the various factors are
that contribute to this result, but clearly one very likely problem is that
many of the observations on natural gas demand are on the supply rather than
the demand curve. In the estimation procedure, the FEA properly omitted
data from the early 1970's, when' markets could no longer be assumed to be
in supply-demand equilibrium due to shortages induced by FPC price reguia-
tion. The estimation of the fuel-split equations used data from the late.
1950's and 1960's. During this period natural gas was simply unavailable
in many areas of the country, although markets were expanding rapidly as
new pipelines opened up new markets. As a result, one year there was little
demand in a consumption region and the next year--after' the pipeline was
opened--there was a significant increase in the fuel share of natural gas,
without any change in relative prices. If the estimation was regionally
disaggregated, then it would be possible to introduce the fact that the gas
price is essentially infinite before the pipeline is built to a region, but
in an estimation based on national aggregates this essential fact is obscured,
and the result is that a supposed estimation of the demand curve is confounded
by estimates that really are points on a shifting supply curve.
In addition to the problem of complementarity between gas and oil pro-
ducts, many of the own price elasticities in Table 3.2 seem very high. For
industrial demand these high elasticities occur because of fuel availability
and locational effects and use of average rather than marginal price for
electricity in demand estimation, while in transportation they likely stem.
from the problem of disentangling price and income effects in the demand
for gasoline. These problems require careful treatment in any case.
However, in a logit-type analysis they are difficult to deal with because
shares change very slowly over time.
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Another problem may arise due to the specification of energy demands
in the industrial sector. Energy is an intermediate good, and the usual
way of dealing with derived or intermediate demand is to estimate final
goods consumptiox, as a function of income and inal goods prices, and then
determine demand for factors (e.g., energy) through a production technology
which is a function of output and price of (all) factors of production. It
is legitimate to collapse demand for final goods and the production tech-
nology into derived demand for factors; but then the derived demand must
be a function of income and all factor prices. Using only energy prices
in specifying demand constitutes a misspecification because the other fac-
tor prices (e.g., wages, cost of capital, cost of other raw materials) have
been omitted. Ideally, the energy prices would be determined from crude
oil, wellhead gas, and minemouth coal prices by refining and transportation
technologies. While lack of data often precludes correct econometric
practice, this consideration would be important in determining the inter-
action of energy prices and GNP growth.
Effect on the Overall Demand Estimate: Given the underlying structure implied
by the results shown in Table 3.2, it is not surprising that the initial
demand forecasts prepared by FEA using the model gave what appeared to be
serious underestimates of the demand for natural gas, particularly at
high oil prices. - (For example, the model has a higher equilibrium price
l/Industrial coal demand also drops as oil prices rise, for the same
reason, although the significance of this effect is dampened somewhat by
the fact that so much coal demand is in the electric sector, which is han-
dled athet wa.y,
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of natural gas at $4 oil than at $11 oil, and more natural gas is consumed
11
with $4 oil than with $11 oil)l
It is apparent that some considerable effort went into attempts to
correct the problem once the counter-intuitive nature of the results was
seen. For one thing, the elasticity matrix that resulted from the pro-
cedure described above was "doctored" to force the model to yield more
reasonable results. Thus, as pointed out in the PIR [1, p. A87], the
elasticities of demand to industrial electricity price and household and
commercial natural gas price (Table 3.2) were scaled down by factors of
six and four respectively as part of this process of imposing judgment on
the econometric results. The precise reason for this adjustment, and its
effect on the results, are not known.
Another form of adjustment of the model to this problem of the dis-
appearance of natural gas demand at high oil prices was in the handling
of the original price trajectories shown in Table 3.1. In this case the
effect on the results is more clear, and damaging. As can be seen in
Table 3.1, the natural gas prices were held constant under all oil price
scenarios at a price roughly equivalent to $7 per barrel oil. The end-
point of the natural gas price trajectory is not raised when oil prices
rise to $11 per barrel for the reason noted earlier, i.e., the natural gas
demand falls to unreasonably low levels when this is done. The reason,
of course, that natural gas demand falls when the oil price rises is because
of the incorrect sign in the cross elasticity of natural gas and oil products.
l/Problems with natural gas exist with supply as well as demand as discussed
in Section 2. Both supply and demand misspecification lead to underes-
timating the amount of gas consumed, especially as the price of oil rises
beyond $7.
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By keeping the natural gas price low in the trajectory, at least some
consumption of natural gas is retained when the oil price rises. However,
this is an ad hoc adjustment which creates additional problems.
It is important to notice the effect of this assumption about price
trajectory for natural gas, coupled with the elasticities in Table 3.2
on the solution to the integrating model. As oil price rises, natural gas
demand does not rise. As a result the price of natural gas in the inte-
grating model is never driven away from this starting assumption because,
in effect, gas supply is never driven up onto the inelastic portion of the
supply function.-/ In fact in some regions, gas prices fall below those
implicit in the vector of initial demands. Three points need to be made
about this set of problems:
(1) Failure to Achieve BTU Equilibrium
Under the "deregulation" assumptions of the PIR, by 1985
sufficient time should have passed so that energy sources which
are nearly perfect substitutes for each other (e.g., natural gas
and distillate) should be in equilibrium with respect to BTU
price (after counting in all transportation and distribution costs).
Using the PIR BTU conversion rates [1, p. A281] and the city-gate
equilibrium prices for distillate, for, say, the Mid-Atlantic
region, the BTU price of distillate is $2.04/million BTU's
[1, p. 273] and the price of natural gas is $1.14/MCF [1, p. A272].
Therefore, a BTU of gas costs only 54% of a BTU of distillate
fuel oil. From elementary cost minimization assumptions, an
-/This cheap gas is not picked up by the electric power sector because the
model is constrained not to install gas-fired generating capacity.
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industry buying at the city gate should buy only natural gas.
Household and commercial users, even after allowing for within
city markups and retail delivery costs should also buy only
natural gas. Yet the model has 3,130 million BTU's of distillate
being consumed in 1985 in the Mid-Atlantic region.- /
To calculate a BTU equilibrium all appropriate costs in-
cluding transportation, storage costs, etc., plus the effects of
long term contracts must be taken into account. Still the most
powerful notion of the economic calculus states that close
substitutes cannot have greatly different prices. Thus, even
when all the complications are considered, the large price dis-
parity between, say, distillate and natural gas could not exist
in a true equilibrium under deregulation. This consideration
must be of extreme importance in determining the role of
alternative fuels such as coal, natural gas, and synthetics in
1985.
(2)' Overestimation of Overall Energy Demand.
Since the natural gas price is never raised above the level
shown in Table 3.1, the price index used in forecasting national
energy demand is underestimated in relation to what it would
be if the model were yielding something closer to BTU equilibrium,
and thus the aggregate demand is overestimated.
- The situation for coal is less clear due to different burning efficiency
and capital cost requirements, but again the price of coal seems well out
of equilibrium even allowing for these additional complications.
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(3) Underestimate of National Gas Consumption
The problem of lost demand for natural gas remains, and in
effect the share of oil (and thus of imports) in overall aggre-
gate demand also appears to be overestimated. As the oil price
rises, the share of natural gas must increase, not decrease, as
the PIR forecasts. The PIR in effect continues the natural gas
shortage due to current regulatory policies. To appreciate
the effect of regulation and the size of the natural gas shortage
if it is continued, the model must be corrected so that reasonable
demand forecasts are made.
These problems are critical for policy evaluation. In an experiment
in which approximate BTU equilibrium prices for gas, coal, and electricity
for $11 oil are used in the original price trajectory, the final equilibrium
gas price rises almost 25% above the Blueprint estimate. / Furthermore,
forecast equilibrium oil imports are reduced by almost a million barrels
a day. If the cross elasticity of natural gas with oil products had the
correct sign, it is likely that oil imports would have fallen even further
given more realistic supply estimates of natural gas. Comparing the PIR
$11 oil results with this attempt at a $11 oil "BTU equilibrium" solution
shows the marked changes. Thus crucial policy questions such as the level
of oil imports are dependent on the price trajectory used in the integrating
model. Furthermore, as expected when a BTU equilibrium is approached gas
and coal have a more important role than the Blueprint finds.
l/In this "BTU equilibrium" run I did not "doctor" the electricity and gas
price elasticities in the industrial sector as the PIR does. This experiment
is meant to be suggestive of how the important policy results can change
with corrections to the model assumptions. However, the basic problem of
incorrect demand estimates cannot be corrected in such an experiment.
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The PIR takes an important problem and proposes a complex model to
evaluate the U.S. energy situation over a relatively long period of time,
1973-1985. It is an impressive initial attempt to construct a flexible
model so that proposed energy policies may be evaluated within a common
framework. However, very serious problems exist with the PIR model. The
major problems which should be carefully considered before using the PIR
model are:
(1) A set of very stringent deregulation assumptions and material
availability assumptions are made in the PIR. If these assumptions do not
hold over time, the results in the PIR may prove to be quite sensitive to
the assumptions. Further evaluation of the model is required to estimate
the importance of possible nonfulfillment of the assumptions.
(2) The energy model is not integrated within a macroeconomic model.
Rather, the macroeconomic variables are taken as exogenous. While the PIR
finds little effect of higher energy prices on GNP and other macroeconomic
factors, this result should be treated with skepticism due to the modeling
technique used.
(3) The modeling approach used in the oil and natural as supply models
is seriously deficient. The most important factors are taken as exogenous
to the models and responsiveness of supply to price changes is underestimated.
Nonassociated gas supply is found to be totally price inelastic; this result
is incorrect and is a result of incorrect "target rates" set exogenously.
Due to the supply models used, the importance of deregulation of domestic
energy prices in increasing domestic energy supply is obscured.
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(4) A key result of the supply model and integrating:'model,...the-. n -." ;- ,~
creasingly important role of electricity generation, is sensitive to sufficient
financing being available and other obstructions to the construction of
nuclear and coal electricity generating capacity being removed. Due to the
long lead times involved, if current policies'are not changed soon electricity
will not expand nearly so much as the PIR forecasts.
(5) The demand model and its interaction with the integrating model
lead to downward biased estimates of the consumption of natural gas and
perhaps coal. The model lacks a "BTU equilibrium" so that in 1985 the PIR
forecasts the (deregulated) price of natural gas to be about half that of
oil on an equivalent BTU basis. Furthermore gas and oil products are found
to be complements, not substitutes, as common sense says they must be so
that the PIR forecasts less gas to be consumed with $11 oil than with
$4 oil prices.
(6) Under the assumed price conditions, the FEA tends to overstate
the likely level of net imports of oil in 1985. If natural gas supply is in
the least price elastic and if natural gas and oil products are substitutes,
the PIR has an upward biased forecast of oil imports. Further depressing
effects on imports might also come through the effect of higher energy
prices on GNP growth. Thus I am considerably more optimistic than the
PIR on domestic energy supply and demand.
To the extent that the assumptions of the PIR do not come about, my conclu-
sions about the likely biases of the PIR forecasts may not be fulfilled.
Yet within their assumed framework, the U.S. could well become a net exporter
of energy in 1985 at well below the $11 price where the PIR forecasts oil
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imports to be above 3 million barrels per day. Apparent support for
President Ford's tariff proposals which the model currently shows are likely
due to the biases inherent in the model. Therefore before the PIR model
is used for policy evaluation purposes, the obvious faults must be corrected.
Otherwise, conclusions drawn from the model are invalid; and policy
formulation which uses the model as input is accepting seriously biased
forecasts of the likely state of energy imports over the next decade.
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